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EPILOGUE: FROM TOO TALL TO TRIM AND SMALL
Mark A. Drumbl*

I grew very tall but didn’t know what to do with my height, the
burden was too great, my back became bent . . . .
—Franz Kafka, Letter to Father (1919)1
The William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal dedicates itself to the study of constitutions. Although the Journal begins in (and with) the United States, it also comparatively looks abroad to foreign venues. In light of its mission, however, the fact that
the Journal holds a symposium on international law is a somewhat nifty—perhaps
even outré—move. It is so because one major difference between law at the international level and law at the national level is that law at the international level lacks much
in the way of intentional constitutionalism. While considerable scholarly work posits
(or questions) an emergent constitutionalization of international law and the idea(l)
of global constitutionalism,2 one thing remains clear: the international legal order is
bereft of any formal, unitary constitution.
Assuredly, there are “constitutionalish” instruments at the international level.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights are two that spring to mind. Many other widely ratified international instruments serve “constitutionalish” functions to protect and empower specific
groups: conventions, for example, promoting the best interests of the child, the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, and the rights of persons with
disabilities. Certain public international organizations moreover may have their own
enabling instruments that functionally structure their internal and external operations
and define them as legal entities. These instruments are more institutional or constitutive than constitutional, however. They can be loosely analogized to corporate
articles of incorporation.3
* Class of 1975 Alumni Professor of Law and Director, Transnational Law Institute,
Washington and Lee University, School of Law. I thank Russ Miller for his input.
1
FRANZ KAFKA, LETTER TO FATHER 53 (K. Reppin trans., Vitalis 2018) (1919).
2
See, e.g., RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); JAN KLABBERS, ANNE
PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011);
Oliver Diggelmann & Tilmann Altwicker, Is There Something Like a Constitution of International Law? A Critical Analysis of the Debate on World Constitutionalism, in 68 ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 623 (2008); Mattias Kumm,
Antje Wiener, Anthony Lang James Tully & Miguel Poiares Maduro, Global Constitutionalism:
Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2012).
3
Here too, constitution-talk emerges: there is a burgeoning literature on corporate
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In any event, all these “constitutionalish” instruments are not constitutions in
any number of classic senses. These instruments do not delegate to a hearty and hale
judicial entity the power to strike down executive, legislative, or administrative
action that may fail to conform to the norms (however defined) contained therein.
Nor does such a judicial constituency even exist—there are no Justice Marshalls to
affirm (or create) powers of judicial review.4 What is more, extant instruments lack
a universality—as Anne Peters notes, there is simply no “super-constitution” at the
international level that hangs over domestic orders or all international subfields.5
Nor can bootstrapping extant instruments from their currently fragmented state(s)
lead to a sum that is larger than the parts. Whereas constitutions at the national level
tend to stand above legislative enactments when it comes to normative value, no
such arrangement exists internationally. While it certainly is true that international
law is moving from a system of interstate order to a system that promotes the rights
of the individual as articulated against the state (and insists that the state provide
certain minima to individuals), when “compared to domestic constitutions, the participation of individuals, their status activus in international legal processes, is extremely underdeveloped.”6 Vidya Kumar, moreover, points to the lack of inclusive
representativeness amid conversations about global constitutionalism. Kumar notes
the omission of the Global South from this discourse. She incisively invokes
Boaventura de Souza Santos’s “sociology of absences” to conclude that “[t]he production of global constitutional theory by global constitutionalists involves the active
non-production of the Global South—as an object or as a subject—of the global
legal order.”7
In sum, then, for all sorts of good reasons, the international legal imagination is
not (yet) keen on some sort of world government enforced by a transnational constabulary that implements a globalitarian constitutional order. A reluctance arises to
replicate internationally what many states have built nationally. And if a global constitutional imperative were to emerge right now, well, it would likely reinforce all
sorts of exclusions—as noted by Kumar, it would not be inclusively cosmopolitan.
governance as constitutionalism. See, e.g., STEPHEN BOTTOMLEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CORPORATION: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2007).
4
The U.S. Constitution, to be sure, does not textually or explicitly establish the power of
judicial review. This power had to be divined by Justice Marshall. See Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Contemporary constitutions for the most part however explicitly
provide for judicial review.
5
Anne Peters, Constitutionalisation, in FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A DISCIPLINE (Jean d’Aspremont & Sahib Singh eds., 2017).
6
Thomas Kleinlein & Anne Peters, International Constitutional Law, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document /obo-9780199796953/obo
-9780199796953-0039.xml [https://perma.cc/J6FA-LZET] (last modified Feb. 22, 2018).
7
Vidya Kumar, Towards a Constitutionalism of the Wretched: Global Constitutionalism,
International Law and the Global South, VOLKERRECHTSBLOG (July 27, 2017), https://voelker
rechtsblog.org/towards-a-constitutionalism-of-the-wretched/ [https://perma.cc/SH5N-MUHY].
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To be sure, in certain regional (at times continental) contexts tangible constitutionalism has emerged. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, for example,
applies the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights among those states that
are parties thereto and who have filed the requisite declarations, including in matters
that involve an individual’s freedom of speech, arrest, detention, and trial at the
national level.8 The framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, and
the powers it grants the European Court of Human Rights over the national practices
of consenting states, reflects another example. John D. Jackson’s contribution to this
symposium unpacks the effect of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights upon exclusionary rules of evidence (notably in the context of right to counsel
and right to examine witnesses) for implicated states.9 In both the African and European
contexts—and to differing degrees inter se—supranational courts have cultivated
a doctrine of “margin of appreciation” in terms of the scope of remedial scrutiny that
they may exercise over domestic state action.
But the international level is different. Things are not ripe at that level; there
simply is no constitutional “there there” yet. International adjudication that occurs
within this void of international constitutionalism presents a curious interface. From
my view, this curiousness comes into sharp relief when international tribunals prosecute individuals for gross violations of international law such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. Göran Sluiter, in fact, begins his contribution to
this symposium by observing that “[w]ithout a constitution and without a history in
developing due process norms, international criminal tribunals have to provide for
instant incorporation of human rights in their respective criminal proceedings.”10
Other contributions to this symposium address this interface in the specific
context of the International Criminal Court (ICC).11 Based in The Hague, the ICC
began operations in 2002 “with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole.”12 ICC judges (and prosecutors) lack an
8

See, e.g., Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. Republic of Rwanda, No. 003/2014, Judgment,
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (Nov. 24, 2017), http://www.african-court.org
/en/images/Cases/Judgment/003-2014-Ingabire%20Victoire%20Umuhoza%20V%20Rwanda
%20-%20Judgement%2024%20November%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UBM-S3TY].
9
John D. Jackson, Common Law Evidence and the Common Law of Human Rights:
Towards a Harmonic Convergence?, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 689 (2019).
10
Göran Sluiter, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings—the Impact of
the Judgement of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers of 26 April 2017, 27 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 623 (2019).
11
Susana SáCouto & Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Bemba Appeals Chamber Judgment:
Impunity for Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes?, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 599 (2019);
Stuart Ford, Understanding Crime Gravity: Exploring the Views of International Criminal Law
Experts, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 659 (2019).
12
The language is from the preamble to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s enabling treaty. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter
Rome Statute, pmbl.]. The ICC has to date convicted three individuals (one on a plea bargain)
and sentenced them to terms of fourteen, twelve, and nine years.
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imperative constitutional instrument to which to turn to guide, control, or justify
what they do. To be sure, the ICC’s enabling instrument (the Rome Statute) does
contain procedural rights.13 Interpretation within an enabling instrument nonetheless
differs from application of rights guaranteed outside of that enabling instrument in
the context of a normative hierarchy of sources of law. This means that, at the ICC
for instance, an acquittal is just that—an acquittal—without any explicit linkage to
the extrinsically higher-order mandated value of ensuring due process, respecting
the rights of the accused, principled development of the law, or keeping prosecutors
and police in check. Teleologically, due process at the ICC is to be determined by
the ICC based on what is best in the moment for it and its functionalities. Due process
is not to be determined in light of what is best—now and in the future—for broader
constituencies or collectivities. Unsurprisingly, then, acquittals trigger consternation
among many international lawyers because they are seen as impeding justice rather
than creating justice. Acquittals are taken as signs of system failure. They are not at
all taken as a “finest hour.” ICC judges lack the “cover” that a legitimate constitution
provides. This is the cover that says: my hands are tied by my duty and my core duty
is to uphold a (the) constitution.
The ICC was not set up to regulate routine affairs in the ways that ordinary
national court systems do. The ICC exists to punish enemies of all humankind. Its
preamble is eloquent in this regard. The state parties that established the ICC did so:
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their
cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that
this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time,
Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and
men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply
shock the conscience of humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security
and well-being of the world,
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that
their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures
at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.14
No ordinary domestic criminal court self-identifies in such a fashion.
Normally human rights activists and advocates are somewhat leery of criminal
courts and jailhouses. They tend to side with the defense. Criminal courts and prisons,
after all, are seen in domestic settings to disproportionately pick on the weakest, give
13
14

See Sluiter, supra note 10, at 637.
Rome Statute, pmbl., supra note 12.
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too much power to the intrusive state, and massively incarcerate minority groups (the
“New Jim Crow,” for example).15 Such themes are constant refrains—as they should
be—in the teaching of criminal law in U.S. law schools. The very same themes mentioned above, in my experience, are virtually absent from the teaching of international criminal law in U.S. law schools. The energy of transnational activism and
global civil society aligns with the prosecution of international crimes by international courts and tribunals.16 Amnesty International, for example, was founded by
British lawyer Peter Benenson to promote the amnesty (a goal so important that it
became its namesake), that is, to release all unfairly convicted persons (in particular
prisoners of conscience) languishing in national jails. Central to this movement was
well-placed suspicion of the coerciveness of penal law. Over the past half-century,
Amnesty International has expanded its work beyond release of prisoners to “upholding
the whole spectrum of human rights.”17 Along this journey, it has become a firm
supporter of criminally prosecuting accused human rights abusers, including before
international tribunals. And the amnesty in cases of alleged serious international
crimes—no matter whether it would help promote peace or not—has become ostracized
as an option. In these contexts, Amnesty International denounces the amnesty.
International courts when enforcing international criminal law are seen as different from national courts when enforcing ordinary national law. There is no lonelier,
and less glorious, place in international criminal law enforcement than being a defense
counsel. Often, defense counsel are constructed as representing monstrous abusers.
They are not appreciated in the way that U.S. public defenders are. Their clients,
after all, are preordained with guilt. A senior official in a genocidal government is
not a case of mistaken identity or the “wrong person in the wrong place.”
The ICC actuates the view that human rights are to be promoted through prosecution and punishment. Fighting impunity has come to hinge upon the coercive force
of international criminal law. Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller, and D.M. Davis unpack
how this new and unquestioned (and at times obsessive) emphasis on criminal punishment represents a deep-rooted change in the positions and priorities of human rights
practitioners.18 And this change, this trend, is accelerating. There is increasingly a
sense that victims have a right to criminal punishment of others, and that failing to
15

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
16
MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2007);
William Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 461, 515 (1997).
17
See Who We Are, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/ [https://
perma.cc/4R6W-XMWA].
18
ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller &
D.M. Davis eds., 2017) (noting also that the focus on anti-impunity has created blind spots that
lead to a constricted response to human rights violations, a narrowed conception of justice, and
an impoverished approach to peace).
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criminally punish someone who “deserves” it is itself a human rights violation.19 This
move may further incent any or all of the following: permissive theories of criminal
liability; diluting mens rea requirements; bending the rules of admissibility; tolerating
lengthy delays; countenancing non-disclosures and anonymous testimony; overlooking
prosecutorial overreach; and nudging invasive searches, seizures, and wiretaps at the
investigatory stage. In domestic systems, penal law tends to be interpreted restrictively in light of principles of nullum crimen sine lege; internationally, however, calls
often arise for international criminal law to be interpreted purposively with restrictive
interpretations seen as stymying. Indeed, Sluiter’s “instant incorporation of human
rights” is not a straightforward process, as he notes, since “the effect of human rights
law in international criminal proceedings has proven at times to be problematic.” Procedure may be prone to being seen skeptically because it gets in the way of what is selfevident, that is, to get on with condemning that accused war criminal (who is already
so difficult to bring into custody and put on trial).20 And when ICC judges are faced
with departures from “rules,” well, they have no imperative to point to say: “Hey, prosecution, get with this because there’s a bigger game in town and that’s the constitution.”
Similarly, Stuart Ford in his contribution to this symposium unravels the conversations that redound regarding the meaning of the term “gravity” which is central to
many stages of the ICC’s jurisdiction and operation.21 Clearly, without being moored
by some sort of gravity (in the sense of the laws of physics), the meaning of gravity
(in the sense of the laws of international crimes, that is, seriousness) may become too
elastic and may trigger jurisdiction over conduct that, at first blush, might only ostensibly fit within the condemnatory solemnity of a major trial in The Hague.
International judges being who they are, namely human, in some instances do
acquit accused génocidaires and war criminals. This is seen in many quarters as a
betrayal; as damaging the entire architectural handiwork of international lawyers and
as harming the very courts on which those judges sit. Without a constitution backing
them up, ICC judges lack shelter (or cover) from or for such commentary.
The Bemba appeal, adroitly discussed by SáCouto and Sellers’s contribution to
this symposium, is a telling example. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo is a senior Congolese politician who was unanimously convicted by the ICC in 2016 at trial as a
commander for failing to prevent or repress the actions of his subordinates (rape,
murder, pillage) from 2002–2003 in the Central African Republic. In June 2018, the
ICC Appeals Chamber in a splintered decision reversed his convictions. A majority
19

See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, The Right to Punishment for International Crimes (Cornell
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-31, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=3134092 [https://perma.cc/H9ZZ-XQJJ]. For a critique, see Saira Mohamed, Criminal
Punishment as a Human Right? (2018) (working draft) (on file with author).
20
Sluiter aptly observes that “[t]here are, unfortunately, some examples in the case law
of international criminal tribunals . . . in which the special character of international criminal
proceedings has played a role in reducing the protection of human rights as they otherwise
would have been available at the national level.” Sluiter, supra note 10, at 634.
21
Ford, supra note 11.
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of three judges (Judges Christine Van den Wyngaert (Belgium), Howard Morrison
(United Kingdom), and Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria, and ICC President)) did so by
ruling, first, that some of the convictions involved acts that were outside of the scope
of the initially confirmed charges, and second, by finding that at trial the application
of command responsibility in the context of a “remote” commander was seriously
in error.22 The ICC Prosecutor responded with an extraordinary statement criticizing
the majority judges in which she noted how the acquittal is unfortunate, in particular
in the case of crimes of sexual violence, in light of the “acute need to send a clear
signal globally that such abhorrent crimes must not go unpunished.”23 It seems that
the judges damaged the ICC by acquitting, and then the Prosecutor piled on and
further sapped the ICC’s legitimacy by faulting the decision not to convict. Academic
commentators, as well, have lamented the acquittal,24 noting in one instance that it
presents “extremely negative consequences” for the ICC.25
Intriguingly, were there to be a global constitution to which ICC judges were
beholden, then perhaps a more solid basis would arise for the sort of criminal law
interpretation urged by the Prosecution and supportive observers. In Bemba, a central
concern is that the approach to command responsibility applied by the Appeals
Chamber fails to fit with the kinds of situations in which sexual violence becomes
pervasive. SáCouto and Sellers persuasively argue that the application of liability
theories, including command responsibility, at the ICC occurs in a discriminatory
manner. This is because, from a vicarious liability perspective, sexual violence
“often occurs because it is tolerated and permitted rather than explicitly ordered or
planned.”26 Hence, a more liberal view of penal liability is warranted. If there were
a constitutional framework, and if that framework actively included women’s equality
protections that judges were duty-bound to respect when interpreting the criminal
law, those exogenous imperatives could then infuse endogenous interpretive needs.
This Epilogue begins to end by looking back to where it began, namely, with the
words of Franz Kafka: “I grew very tall but didn’t know what to do with my height,
22

Two of these judges (Van den Wyngaert and Morrison) acquitted entirely on the facts
instead of ordering a new trial. Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng (Botswana) and Judge Piotr
Hofmañski (Poland) appended a joint dissenting opinion that disagreed with the majority’s
decision to acquit. See ICC Appeals Chamber Acquits Mr. Bemba From Charges of War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, ICC (June 8, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages
/item.aspx?name=pr1390 [https://perma.cc/PD3E-RAWZ].
23
Statement of the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the Recent Judgment of the ICC
Appeal Chamber Acquitting Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC (June 13, 2018), https://
www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180613-OTP-stat (noting that “[n]otwithstanding
the ultimate outcome of this decision, the Court will continue with renewed determination
its fight against impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes”).
24
See SáCouto & Sellers, supra note 11, at 599–600.
25
AlexWhiting, Appeals Judge Turns the ICC on its Head With Bemba Decision, JUST
SECURITY (June 14, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/57760/appeals-judges-turn-icc-head
-bemba-decision/ [https://perma.cc/N4EV-LCL3].
26
SáCouto & Sellers, supra note 11, at 600–01 n.10.
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the burden was too great, my back became bent . . . .”27 Kafka’s is not a letter about
law, whether international, national, or local. It is a letter about childhood, to wit,
his childhood in Prague. Along with masterpiece novels, Kafka wrote over 1,500
letters in the forty-one years of his life. Letter to Father, which he penned at the age
of thirty-six, is his longest. It filled over 100 sides of written manuscript pages. Yet
Kafka never sent it. Instead, it published well after his death and after the death—
several years later—of his father, to whom the letter was addressed. Hermann Kafka,
his father, was by all means a towering—if not omniscient—figure (certainly to
Franz). Starting from nothing in a village in Bohemia, Hermann began as a haberdasher only to become a commercially successful shopkeeper. His shop, located in
the center of Prague’s gorgeous Old Town, was a fixture of Franz’s childhood.
Franz’s memories, however, were sour. His father was strict and demanding. He was
tough. Franz, the eldest and only surviving boy, was not. Franz struggled—as all
children do, though Franz struggled a great deal—to be himself, to become himself,
to move out of the shadows of the adult, to speak and not only be spoken to. So
when Franz grew up tall, well, he never became strapping for he never knew what
to do with his height. For Kafka, height was too much of a burden. So he became
bent, his shoulders sloped, he shuffled and slogged along.
As for international law, it is taken by so many to be so tall. And it is my intuition that, as it becomes taller as a repository for so many hopes and dreams, well, it
buckles and bends. It becomes brittle. It doesn’t know what to do with all that responsibility. The sheer weight of those hopes and dreams simply becomes too much.
What, then, to do? Ramrodding international law, buttressing it with the titanium
spine of constitutionalism, is not a solution. As I mentioned earlier, the international
legal imagination does not seem ready for global constitutionalism in a hard and firm
sense. Instruments that are softer, more aspirational, and more scattered are likely
more reflective of the current Zeitgeist and the headspace du jour. So, then what?
For me the answer involves (re)calibrating expectations. It lies with anticipating less
from international law in all its forms and varieties; to gaze less beseechingly at its
hues and colors; to lighten the load squared upon its institutions, including international criminal courts and tribunals. It is paradoxical to avoid global constitutionalism, on the one hand, and then remain vexed when the half-way houses that actually
are created do not keep out all the rain (nor stave it off in the first place). The goals
placed on international criminal tribunals—to end war, bring closure to victims of
atrocity, and imagine justice for “unimaginable atrocities”28—are altitudinous. It is
unfair—such daunting goals set the institution up for failure from the start for it is
made to portend something it can never produce. The result, then, is a chronic state
of disappointment. Courts of law cannot deliver us from evil. They are not the “hand
of the Almighty,” to draw from Bob Marley’s beautiful “Redemption Songs,” whose
“touch” messianically lifts from “the bottomless pit.”
27
28

KAFKA, supra note 1, at 53.
Rome Statute, pmbl., supra note 12.
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Critics of these international courts, particularly from the political realist side,
should also temper their vociferousness. They should do so because their fears of the
“height” of these institutions are wildly exaggerated since the institutions cannot
deliver the threats with which critics imbue them. The institutions lack the capacity.
So this vociferousness becomes nothing more than spittle and bloviating.
What if international lawyers did a volte-face? What if international lawyers
engaged a bit more with private orderings and alternate frameworks and welcomed
smaller yet trimmer scales: less grandiosity and globalism and more modesty and
localism? When it comes to atrocity crimes, for example, alternate methods of transitional justice in the aftermath of collective violence—truth commissions, traditional ceremonies, public inquiries, memorials and commemorations, bottom-up
initiatives that may look less like “law” but look a lot more like “life”—are seen by
the international legal imagination at most as “second best.” The international criminal
trial—beginning at Nuremberg—has captured the international legal imagination as
the “first best” way to deliver justice.29 Perhaps it makes sense to revisit this.
Lan Cao, in her bold contribution to this symposium, guides her readers in this
direction.30 She does not do so in the case of war criminals, to be sure, but in the context of the possibilities of economic development and social ordering under “charter
cities.” From Cao’s perspective, cities “have become innovative global actors participating in the international arena in their own right, even as they retain their subordinate
status within the nation.” Flowing from this, charter cities represent special economic
zones in which improvised practices that depart from national laws may regulate
economic and social life. Although on the one hand charter cities may be viewed
dubiously for the deregulation, lack of democracy, and neocolonialism that they may
bring, on the other hand they open spaces to refresh the intersections between local
private ordering and global public governance that, in certain ways, might alleviate
some of the unattainable burdens that currently yoke international institutions. Charter
cities may also be more nimble and adept. One example is how cities, often chock full
of citizens with more congruent political bandwidths, might be better able to achieve
consensus on addressing climate change than nations (let alone the sprawling international community), whose failures to do anything meaningful in this regard pose a
wretched threat to sustainable intergenerational equity. Other examples may arise,
as well, ranging from provision of health care services, to housing, to education.
To actually end, then, albeit by gesturing ahead: perhaps a future Journal symposium could be as successful as this one by jumping to the far other point of the
geographic spectrum to explore inchoate constitutionalism(s) at the local or municipal level(s).
29

Mark A. Drumbl, The Future of International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice,
in RESEARCH COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 531,
532 (William Schabas, Yvonne McDermott & Niamh Hayes eds., 2013).
30
Lan Cao, Charter Cities, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 717 (2019).

